In this paper we study continuous-time two-player zero-sum optimal switching games on a finite horizon. Using the theory of doubly reflected BSDEs with interconnected barriers, we show that this game has a value and an equilibrium in the players' switching controls.
1 Zero-sum optimal switching game Optimal switching is a generalisation of optimal stopping which has various applications in economics and mathematical finance. It consists of one or more agents and a system which they control by successively switching the system's operational mode according to a discrete set of choices. There are several works on optimal switching problems in continuous time, and a survey of the literature identifies two main approaches: an analytical approach using partial differential equations (PDEs) and a probabilistic one.
Methods based on PDEs and associated variational inequalities appeared as early as the 1970s, under the topic of impulsive control for diffusion processes (see [1] and the references therein). A viscosity solutions approach to this type of PDE appeared in the late 1980s to early 1990s (for instance, [2] ) and is still the topic of active research [3] .
Probabilistic solution methods were being applied since the 1970s and 1980s in various degrees of generality (see [1, 4, 5, 6, 7] for instance), and most of the recent research in this area has been a combination of the martingale approach via Snell envelopes ( [8, 9] ) and the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE) ( [10, 11, 12] ).
All of the aforementioned references are concerned with single-person optimisation problems. Multiple-person optimal switching problems in a stochastic setting, the topic under which the present work falls, have been studied less frequently in the literature (there is related work for deterministic systems such as [13, 14] ). In the zero-sum setting there are previous works in continuous time including [15, 16, 17] and, if viewed as a special case of impulse control games, [18, 19] .
From the probabilistic point of view, the zero-sum switching game leads to the study of the following system of reflected BSDEs with inter-connected bilateral obstacles: Find a system of processes (Y i,j , Z i,j , K i,j ) (i,j)∈Γ such that for any (i, where: i) Γ 1 = {1, ...m 1 } and Γ 2 = {1, ...m 2 } are operational modes controlled by players 1 and 2 respectively, and Γ = Γ 1 ×Γ 2 is the set of operational modes for the system; ii) f i,j , g i,k andǧ j, (resp. h i,j ) are given stochastic processes (resp. random variables) defining the game's economic data; iii) K i,j is a finite variation process and K i,j,± are the increasing processes in its orthogonal decomposition
In the diffusion framework, randomness stems from an R k -valued diffusion process
In this setting, the system (1.1) is connected to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system of PDEs with obstacles: For any (i, j) ∈ Γ and (s,
where L X is the generator associated with X s,
System (1.1) is studied, for example, in [16] where it is shown that the solution exists whenǧ j, andĝ i,k are constant. In the diffusion framework, it is also studied in [17] where the authors have shown that the solution exists and is unique under rather mild regularity assumptions on the data. The connection, through the usual Feynman-Kac formula, with the viscosity solution to the system of PDEs (1.3) is also established. However, the interpretation of Y i,j (or v i,j ) as the value of the underlying zero-sum switching game, as might be expected, is stated only in the case when f i,j and h i,j are separated with respect to i and j: f i,j = f
The case when f i,j or h i,j are not separated is still open, and its resolution is the main objective of this work. In particular, we show that the solution of system (1.1), when it exists (for example, in the diffusion framework), coincides with the value function of the zero-sum switching game. As a result, the unique viscosity solution to the system of PDEs (1.3) coincides with the value function of the associated zero-sum switching game. This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the zero-sum switching game. In Section 3, we show the main result, that Y i,j coincides with the value of the zero-sum game. Moreover, we provide results on the existence of optimal strategies in the game. For completeness, we also interpret our findings in the diffusion framework.
Probabilistic setup and notation
We follow closely the setup in [17] , working on a finite horizon [0, T ] and filtered probability space (Ω, F, F, P) where F = (F t ) 0≤t≤T is the usual completion of the natural filtration of B = (B t ) 0≤t≤T , a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion.
• Let T be the set of F-stopping times bounded above by T , and for a given ν ∈ T , T ν the set of all τ ∈ T satisfying τ ≥ ν a.s.
• For any sub-σ-algebraF of F, let L p (F), 1 ≤ p < ∞, denote the set of p-integrablê F-measurable random variables, and set L p := L p (F).
• Let H 2 be the set of F-progressively measurable processes w = (w t ) 0≤t≤T satisfying,
• Let S 2 be the set of F-adapted processes w = (w t ) 0≤t≤T with paths that are rightcontinuous with left limits satisfying,
Let S 2 c ⊂ S 2 denote the subset of processes w ∈ S 2 with continuous paths.
• Let K 2 denote the set of F-adapted right-continuous with left limits processes K of finite variation satisfying K 0 = 0 and,
where |dK t (ω)| is the total variation measure on [0, T ]. Let K 2 c denote the subset of processes K ∈ K 2 with continuous paths. 
Costs, rewards and switching controls
Let Γ k = {1, . . . , m k }, k ∈ {1, 2}, be a finite, discrete set representing the operating modes that player k can choose. Let Γ = Γ 1 × Γ 2 denote the product space of operating modes γ = (γ (1) , γ (2) ), having cardinality |Γ| = m = m 1 × m 2 .
• For (i, j) ∈ Γ, f i,j ∈ H 2 defines a running reward paid by player 2 to player 1 and h i,j ∈ L 2 (F T ) a terminal reward paid by player 2 to player 1, when player 1's (resp. player 2's) active mode is i (resp. j).
c defines a non-negative payment from player 1 to player 2 when the former switches from i 1 to i 2 .
• For
c defines a non-negative payment from player 2 to player 1 when the former switches from mode j 1 to j 2 .
For all (i, j) ∈ Γ and t ∈ [0, T ] we setĝ i,i t =ǧ j,j t = 0.
Individual switching controls and strategies
Definition 2 (Switching controls and their indicator functions). A control for player 1 is a sequence α = (σ n , ξ n ) n≥0 such that, 1. for all n ≥ 0, σ n ∈ T and is such that σ n ≤ σ n+1 , P-a.s., and P({σ n < T ∀n ≥ 0}) = 0;
2. for all n ≥ 0, ξ n is an F σn -measurable Γ 1 -valued random variable;
3. for n ≥ 1, on {σ n < T } we have σ n < σ n+1 and ξ n = ξ n−1 , while on {σ n = T } we have ξ n = ξ n−1 .
Let A denote the set of controls for player 1. The set B of controls β = (τ n , ζ n ) n≥0 for player 2, where the ζ n are Γ 2 -valued, is defined analogously. Denoting by C 
Let A denote the set of such controls. Similarly, the set B of square-integrable controls for player 2 consists of those β ∈ B satisfying,
where
and
are said to be equivalent, denoting this by
if we have a.s.,
A non-anticipative strategy for player 1 is a mapping α : B → A such that:
• Non-anticipativity: for any s ∈ [0, T ], ν ∈ T s , and
• Square-integrability: for any β ∈ B we have α(β) ∈ A.
In a similar manner we define non-anticipative strategies for player 2. Let A and B denote the set of non-anticipative strategies for players 1 and 2 respectively. 
Coupling of controls
We now define the coupling of two controls α ∈ A and β ∈ B under the following assumption: player 1's switch is implemented first if both players decide to switch at the same instant.
Definition 6. Given controls α ∈ A and β ∈ B, define the coupling γ(α, β) = (ρ n , γ n ) n≥0 where ρ n ∈ T is defined by,
with r 0 = s 0 = 0, r 1 = s 1 = 1 and for n ≥ 2, r n = r n−1 + 1 {σr n−1 ≤ τs n−1 } , s n = s n−1 + 1 {τs n−1 < σr n−1 } , and γ n is a Γ-valued random variable such that γ 0 = (ξ 0 , ζ 0 ) and for n ≥ 1,
Define for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
where (ρ n , ρ n+1 ] = ∅ on {ρ n = ρ n+1 }. Note that the coupling γ(α, β) = (ρ n , γ n ) n≥0 of the controls α ∈ A i s and β ∈ B j s has the following properties:
1. ρ 0 = s and for all n ≥ 0 we have ρ n ∈ T and ρ n ≤ ρ n+1 P-a.s., and P({ρ n < T ∀n ≥ 0}) = 0;
2. γ 0 = (i, j) and for all n ≥ 0 the random variable γ n is F ρn -measurable, Γ-valued and γ n+1 = γ n on {ρ n+1 < T }.
for the joint cumulative cost of the first N switches,
Note that for every α ∈ A and β ∈ B we have lim
Using the triangle inequality, we see that every pair of square-integrable controls (α, β), α ∈ A 
The zero-sum switching game
For the zero-sum game we assume that player 1 is the maximiser and define the total reward from its perspective. Letting (s, i, j) ∈ [0, T ) × Γ be the initial state and recalling (2.3), we have 
The common value V i,j s , when it exists, is referred to as the game's solution at (s, i, j). When s = T we formally setV
In this paper we construct a pair of controls (α
and the game has a value V i,j s = J i,j s (γ(α * , β * )) (see Theorem 3.1 below). Such a result was obtained in [17] under the assumption f i,j = f
Our result is obtained by dynamic programming and the connection between doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equations (DRBSDEs) with implicitly defined barriers and zero-sum optimal stopping games. We also prove the existence of optimal non-anticipative strategies α * ∈ A i s and β * ∈ B j s which are robust in the sense that each is a best response to the worst-case opponent. j 1 ) , . . . , (i N , j N )} of elements in Γ with N − 1 distinct members such that (i N , j N ) = (i 1 respectively, as follows: where K i,j,+ and K i,j,− are the increasing processes in the orthogonal decomposition
Assumptions
Note that for any solution to (1.1), the stochastic integral
s dB s is well-defined, and is a martingale belonging to S (ii) Existence of optimal controls: there exists a pair of controls (α
(iii) Existence of optimal strategies: there exist non-anticipative strategies α * ∈ A This concept of robustness, which is well known in the optimal control and differential games literature [22, 23, 24] , is natural in the context of zero-sum games [19] . Remark 3.2. Since the switching costs are non-negative we get the following type of Mokobodski's condition: there exists a system of processes w = {w i,j } (i,j)∈Γ belonging to W 2,m c such that for all (i, j) ∈ Γ: for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s.,
Indeed, by taking w to be the m-dimensional null process, w ≡ 0, it is easily verified that w ∈ W 2,m c and (3.3) holds. Mokobodski's condition (3.3) is an extension of that typically assumed for single-agent switching problems in a variety of settings [9, 11, 25, 26] , or for two-player Dynkin games or DRBSDEs [27, 28, 29, 30, 31] , both of which are special, somewhat degenerate, cases of the optimal switching game studied here.
Let us point out that for any solution (Y , Z, K) to the DRBSDE (1.1), Y satisfies Mokobodski's condition (3.3) and, a posteriori, also belongs to W 2,m c . Condition (3.3) can therefore be seen as a feasibility check for the inequality constraint (1.1)-(ii): there exists at least one system of processes Y which satisfies (1.1)-(ii) within a suitable class of candidates. Actually, we know from the results in [30] that well-posedness of (1.1) is intricately linked to Mokobodski's condition (3.3).
Proof of Theorem 3.1
The existence of a solution to the DRBSDE (1.1) is closely related to the existence of both a value and a Nash equilibrium in the following Dynkin game (see for example [28, 31, 32] , and also [18] for the relation to impulse control games with delay). where,
5)
and h, f , L and U are the data for (1.1) (see Definition 10) . Proof. Recalling the ordering (1.1)-(ii), the result follows from Proposition 2.2.1 of [32] , for example.
We will use Proposition 3.3 and a dynamic programming argument to first establish claim (i) of Theorem 3.1, then obtain (ii) and (iii) as corollaries. Since (3.2) trivially holds when s = T , let s ∈ [0, T ) and (i, j) ∈ Γ be arbitrary. Define a sequence (ρ n , γ n ) n≥0 as follows, ρ 0 = s, γ 0 = (i, j) and for n ≥ 1, (3.8)
where σ γ n−1 ρ n−1
and τ
are defined using (3.6) above, L γ n−1 ρn and U γ n−1 ρn are obtained from the switching selectors, 
Lemma 3.4. Under the conditions of Theorem 3.1 we have
where u is defined using (2.3).
Proof. We begin by establishing that α * ∈ A i s . The non-free loop property (2.9) prevents accumulation of the switching times ρ * n , in the sense that P({ρ * n < T ∀n ≥ 0}) = 0 (see, for example, [33, pp. 192-193] ). Since σ * n ≥ ρ n for n ≥ 0, it follows that P({σ * n < T ∀n ≥ 0}) = 0. Also, the consistency property (2.7) ensures that it is not optimal for a single player to switch twice at the same instant, so we have σ * n < σ * n+1 on {σ * n < T } for n ≥ 1 (see [9] or [33] ). By the construction of α * , noting that u
-measurable since F is right-continuous, the remaining parts of Definition 2 are satisfied, and α
s by proceeding in a similar manner to [33] . Using (1.1)-(i) and (1.1)-(iii) together with the construction of ρ 1 gives P-a.s.,
By considering the first switch for either player we have
(to account for the event {ρ 1 = T }, recall thatĝ i,i t =ǧ j,j t = 0). Proceeding iteratively for n = 1, . . . , N we obtain by substitution
from which we obtain
Z ur r dB r , which is a welldefined square-integrable martingale on [s, T ] [21] . Continuing from (3.14) we have a.s.,
The right-hand side of (3.15) is a square-integrable random variable, thereby proving
s. by taking conditional expectations in (3.13) then passing to the limit N → ∞, which is justified since γ(α
For a given α = (σ n , ξ n ) n≥0 ∈ A i s , let β * (α) = (τ n , ζ n ) n≥0 be the control for player 2 defined similarly to (3.11) with the sequence (ρ n , γ n ) n≥0 constructed by, ρ 0 = s, γ 0 = (i, j) and for n ≥ 1, (3.17)
n−1 , onM
where U γ n−1 ρn is obtained from (3.10),τ n := τ
for n ≥ 1, {ř n } n≥0 is defined iteratively byř 0 = 0,ř 1 = 1 and for n ≥ 2,ř n =ř n−1 + 1 {σř n−1 ≤τ n−1 } , and for n ≥ 1,M + n andM − n are the events,
In an analogous manner using the lower switching selector L(Y ) in (3.10), for each β ∈ B j s we define α * (β) ∈ A j s for player 1. The following lemma points out key properties of α * and β * utilised below to finish the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
s . To show that this control is square-integrable we will proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3.4, to obtain that a.s.,
where, in contrast to the proof of Lemma 3.4, here α is arbitrary and so γ 
Since P({ρ N < T ∀N ≥ 1}) = 0 the limits as N → ∞ on both sides of (3.21) are well defined. As the switching costs are non-negative we have
, and f i,j , Z i,j belong to H 2 for all (i, j) ∈ Γ, the random variable on the right-hand side of (3.22) belongs to L 2 and we conclude that the control β is square-integrable.
Proof of (ii): We only show the first equality in (3.19) as the second follows via similar arguments. We proceed by showing that for every α ∈ A 25) where the functionsf i,j ,h i,j ,ĝ i,k andǧ j, are deterministic, continuous and of polynomial growth with respect to x. We then have: Theorem 3.7 (see [17] ). Assume that: a) the functionsh i,j ,ĝ i,k andǧ j, , (i, j) ∈ Γ, k ∈ Γ 1 , ∈ Γ 2 , verify the properties of positivity, consistency and non-free loop of Assumption 1.
b) The functionsǧ j, , j, ∈ Γ 2 orĝ i,k , i, k ∈ Γ 1 are C 1,2 and their derivatives are of polynomial growth.
Then there exists a system of processes (Y i,j , Z i,j , K i,j ) (i,j)∈Γ which satisfy (1.1) on [s, T ], and for any (i, j) ∈ Γ, Y i,j t , t ∈ [s, T ] verifies (3.2) and (2.6). Moreover, there also exist deterministic continuous functions with polynomial growth (v i,j (s, x)) (i,j)∈Γ such that for any (i, j) and t ∈ [s, T ], Y i,j t = v i,j (t, X s,x t ) and (v i,j (s, x)) (i,j)∈Γ is the unique solution in viscosity sense of system (1.3).
